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THE UTILITY REQUIREMENT FOR PATENTING
THERAPEUTIC INVENTIONS
INTRODUCTION

Utility,1 novelty2 and nonobviousness3 are the three statutory
prerequisites to patenting an invention. In the pharmaceutical field,4
the extent and nature of evidence necessary to meet the utility requirement has been a hotly debated issue, spawning two contending
schools of opinions. The Patent Office and certain jurisdictions have
held that a medical invention, to be patentable, must be shown safe
and actually effective by the performance of clinicial tests on humans. 5 A second theory, which is now firmly rooted in the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA),6 is that a showing of safety
and commercial operativeness is not necessary to satisfy the statutory
requirement: statistical data established by a "standard" test should
be sufficient so long as the proof can convince a person of ordinary
skill in the art that the claimed invention is useful as alleged in the
7
patent specification.
Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has offered clear guidelines. The Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson8 abstained from ex1. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C § 101 (1970).

2. Id. § 102.
3. Id. § 103.

4. For the purpose of this discussion, the terms "medical," "medicinal," "pharmaceutical" and "therapeutic" are used interchangeably, although the lexiconical definition
of "therapeutic" may embrace a broader connotation than the word "pharmaceutical."
See WEBSTER's THmD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1694, 2372 (3d ed. 1967).
Patent practitioners seem to exclude most mechanical instruments from this category.
Thus, patent claims in "pharmaceutical applications" generally consist of (1) compounds
per se; (2) methods of synthesizing them; (3) compositions of such substances in connection with other carriers; and (4) methods of using them. Jacobs, Seminar VI Pharmaceutical Invention, 47 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 663, 665 (1965). Obviously, the treatment
of a disease is not a sine qua non for an invention to be regarded as pharmaceutical.
See, e.g., Hoover v. Eckerd's Cut Rate Medicine Co., 53 F.2d 215 (D. Del. 1931) (a
dentifrice composition which calcifies human teeth); In re Oberweger, 115 F.2d 826
(C.C.P.A. 1940) (treatment for the human scalp for restoring hair on bald heads).
5. See notes 23-26 infra & accompanying text.
6. See notes 32-36 infra & accompanying text.
7. Judge Rich advocated this principle in his early decision of In re Nelson, 280
F.2d 172 (C.C.P.A. 1960). His answer to the question "Useful to whom and for what?"
was that an invention is "useful" if it is useful to research workers in the pertinent art.
Id. at 180.
8. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
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pressing an opinion as to the validity of requiring clinical tests on
humans. 9 Congress, on the other hand, authorized the Commissioner
of Patents to acquire technical data relating to a medicinal patent
application from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW).1° At the same time, it also enlarged the jurisdiction of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to check the effectiveness of
new drugs." The Patent Office believed that it was empowered to
use the technical information obtained through this machinery to
determine the patentability of medicinal substances. 12 The Office's
assumption of such power, however, was vehemently opposed by the
CCPA. The court argued that the congressional enlargement of the
FDA's authority preempted the power claimed by the Patent Office;
and further, that any decision by the FDA 3 on the safety and effectiveness of a new drug is irrelevant to the issue of patentability,
for ultimate commercial utility is not a requirement for obtaining a
patent.' 4
This Comment attempts to expose the main issues underlying
this confrontation. The early history of the two competing contentions is first reviewed, then the impact of congressional acts and the
9. Id. at 531 n.17. The Court then added that only commercially useful inventions are patentable. Id. at 536 (dictum). Dissenting opinions criticized the dictum because it discourages early publication of inventions and thereby hampers the research
workers' acquisition of up-to-date information. Id. at 539 (Harlan & Douglas, JJ., dissenting).
10. 21 U.S.C. § 372(d) (1970) provides in relevant part: "The Secretary is
authorized and directed, upon request from the Commissioner of Patents, to furnish full
and complete information with respect to such questions relating to drugs as the Commissioner may submit concerning any patent application."
11. Id. § 355(d) of the law enumerates six grounds for refusing applications of
new drugs. They are:
(1) applicant's failure to submit adequate test results showing whether or not
such drug is safe for use under the conditions prescribed;
(2) the results of such tests show that such drug is unsafe for use under such
conditions or do not show that such drug is safe for use under such conditions;
(3) the methods used in the manufacture, processing, and packing of such
drugs are inadequate to preserve its identity, strength, quality, and purity;
(4) applicant's insufficient information to determine the safety;
(5) lack of substantial evidence that the drug will have the purported
effect; and
(6) false or misleading labelling.
12. See 35 GEo. WAsH. L. Rxv. 93, 103 (1966).
13. 21 U.S.C. § 372(a) provides: "The Secretary is authorized to conduct examinations and investigations . . . through any health, food, or drug officer

missioned by the Secretary ....
"
14. See, e.g.,In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1962).

. . .

duly com-
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Supreme Court's decision in Manson are analyzed. Finally, recent developments are studied in search for the real identity of the controversy and a proper course leading to its resolution.

I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFRONTATION

Ever since the nation's first Patent Act of 1790r, instituted the
requirement that a patentable invention be "useful," the concept of
utility has been one of the basic principles in framing patentability
standards. Mr. Justice Story, in his two landmark decisions, 16 developed a judicial test for prescribing a "useful" invention which
remains influential today. His basic thesis was that an invention is
useful unless it is "frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good
policy, or sound morals of society."' 7 This liberal definition is partly
responsible for the fact that utility, with certain exceptions, is the
easiest of the three requirements to satisfy.
With the public's increasing wariness of "patented" quackeries
and "cure-alls,"' 8 the Patent Office has begun to feel obligated to
check alleged uses of therapeutic inventions. In response to this con9 upheld
cern, the CCPA in In re Bremner"
the requirement, newly
instituted by the Patent Office, that there be a specific disclosure of
utility in the patent specification. 20 The upshot of Bremner is that
every patent application must describe at least one use and it is incumbent upon the applicant to verify that use with supporting evi21
dence.

A. Isenstead v. Watson: Strict Requirement of Clinical Tests
Following the basis tenet of Bremner, the Patent Office, joined
by some federal district courts, 22 has become the standard-bearer of
15. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 17, 1 Stat. 109.
16. Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (No. 8568) (C.G.D. Mass. 1817); Bedford
v. Hunt, 3 F. Cas. 37 (No. 1217) (C.G.D. Mass. 1817).

17. 15 F. Gas. at 1019.

18. For interesting episodes on early patents, see Marcus, The Patent Of/ice and
PharmaceuticalInvention, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SoC'y 669, 671 (1965).
19. 182 F.2d 216 (O.C.P.A. 1950).
20. Id. at 217.
21. 19 CATHoLic U.L. Rnv. 522, 526 (1970).
22. See, e.g., Commonwealth Eng'r Co. v. Ladd, 199 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1961).
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the position that applications for medicinal patents should be accompanied by clear and convincing clinical tests conducted on humans. The District Court for the District of Columbia in Isenstead
v. Watson 23 analogized that if the -term "useful" as applied to a mechanical patent means that "the machine will accomplish the [alleged]
purpose practically when applied in industry, '24 then a claimed "useful" drug should be proven in a similar fashion. Isenstead further
expounded:
Great care and scrutiny should be particularly taken in connection with applications for medical patents. While the granting
of a patent does not legally constitute a certificate that the medicine to which it relates is a good medicine and will cure the disease
or successfully make the test which it was intended to do, nevertheless, the granting of such a patent gives a kind of official imprimatur
to the medicine in question on which as a moral matter some members of the public are likely to rely.25
The logic of Isenstead has not gone uncriticized. An unsafe drug,
even if patented, may not easily reach the consumer's hand, for it
must pass stringent tests of safety administered by proper authority
before being marketed. 26 Moreover, the premise that the Patent Office has concurrent jurisdiction to regulate the safety and effectiveness of a medicament ignores the practical aspect. Since the Patent
Office has never been authorized with staff or equipment to check the
safety and alleged utility of drugs, one may question whether Congress, absent clear expression of its legislative will, granted such power
to the Office.
The analogy between a mechanical creation and a medical substance misses crucial differences between the two. The use of a drug,
unlike a mechanical device, is often hampered by unpredictable aftereffects or idiosyncratic responses. Consequently, it requires an additional period to perfect clinical tests which meet the required standard.
Such added period exposes the inventor to the risk of losing his potential monopoly rights through premature disclosure by his inad23. 157 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1957).
24. Id. at 9, citing Besser v. Merrilat Culvert Core Co., 243 F. 611, 612 (8th Cir.
1917) (emphasis added).
25. 157 F. Supp. at 9.
26. See In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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vertence or for other reasons.27 The withholding of information also
betrays a paramount purpose of the patent system: promotion of the
progress of useful arts by encouraging prompt disclosure of inven28

tions.

The initial challenge against Isenstead was made under a narrow
and technically drawn issue: if the specification describes merely that
a new and nonobvious compound is effective in curing certain conditions existing in animals, would not proof based on standard animal
tests be sufficient notwithstanding the fact that the ultimate goal of
the invention lies in human uses?
B. The CCPA's Departure from the Strict Rule
Blicke v. Treves2 9 is one of the early decisions where the applicant successfully circumvented the Isenstead rule by resorting to
this technical approach. The Blicke application disclosed that the
claimed compounds produced an innocuous antispasmodic effect30
on the "animal organism." The alleged efficacy was supported by laboratory tests on rabbits. The CCPA, reversing the examiner's rejection, distinguished Isenstead on two grounds: (1) the Blicke application did not specifically mention human therapy; and (2) the
alleged utility was of a "pharmacological" nature as distinguished
from the direct curing of a disease. Neither of these reasons seems
persuasive, however, inasmuch as the invention was admittedly in31
tended for human uses.
32
The CCPA gradually broadened the scope of this "exception."
27. The Patent Act does not differentiate between a divulgence made as a result
of theft or breach of trust by a third party, and a disclosure made voluntarily. 35
U.S.C. § 102 (1970).
28. See, e.g., 17 Da PAUL L. REv. 417, 424 (1968).
29. 241 F.2d 718 (C.C.P.A. 1959).
30. Id. at 721.
31. Treves was the patentee of the antispasmodic compounds in question, but the
court found that Blicke had made the invention before Treves. Treves then argued that
Blicke should be required to produce proof of utility based on clinical tests on humans.
Ironically, Treves' own patent document described tests on animals only. Id. From what
actually transpired in the proceedings, one can clearly conclude that the court was
aware that human therapy was the ultimate purpose of the invention. It was also revealed that, after having conducted the animal tests, Blicke waited for almost three
years before filing his patent application, possibly hoping to obtain some further clinical
data on humans. Id.
32. See, e.g., In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re Hitchings, 342
F.2d 80 (C.O.P.A. 1965); In re Dodson, 292 F.2d 948 (C.G.P.A. 1961); cf. In re
Novak, 306 F.2d 924 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
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Judge Martin, in two well-regarded opinions, launched a direct attack
at Isenstead. In In re Krimme 33 the main question was whether a
test restricted to laboratory animals was sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirement of utility when the claimed compounds were allegedly useful in curing a condition which can occur both in man
and in lower animals. The court answered in the affirmative, so long
as the test was one "usually used by those skilled in the art to establish the particular pharmaceutical application in question."3 4 The
court felt that it was not bound by Isenstead and justified its holding on the ground that
the Patent Office has not been charged by Congress with the task
of protecting the public against possible misuse of chemical patents.
There is nothing in the patent statute or any other statutes called
to our attention which gives the Patent Office the right or the duty
to require an applicant to prove that compounds or other materials
which he is claiming, and which he has stated are useful for "pharmaceutical applications," are safe, effective, and reliable for use with
humans. It is not for us or the Patent Office to legislate and if
the Congress desires to give this responsibility to the Patent Office,
it should do so by statute.3 5
This position was reaffirmed in In re Hartop.30 Following the
Krimmel holding, the court took judicial notice that, in the field
of drugs and medicaments, safety is a relative matter as evidenced by
many important therapeutic substances known to have undesirable
side effects. 3 7 The court did not question the importance of guarding

the public from the advertising and distribution of harmful drugs;
but referred to many provisions of federal statutes that empower administrative agencies to carry out the public protector's role.38 It
also stated that Congress did not enact a separate "patent statute for
drugs" embodying the detailed restrictions contained in the Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act or the Federal Trade Commission
33. 292 F.2d 948 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
34. Id. at 953.
35. Id. at 954.
36. 311 F.2d 249 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
37. The concurring judge, referring to the previous patenting of the "now infamous
drug thalidomide," argued that "the issuance of a patent is not . . . an 'imprimatur' as
to the safety and effectiveness of any pharmaceutical product for any purpose." Id. at
263 (Smith, J., concurring).
38. Id. at 258-59.
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Act. 39 In addition, the court noted that almost all of the states have

enacted regulatory measures governing the intrastate advertising and
sale of drugs. 40 Thus, before the Commissioner of Patents decided
to ask for intervention by Congress and the Supreme Court of the
United States, it appeared that the dispute between the Patent Office
and the CCPA over the utility requirement for pharmaceuticals had
been resolved.
II. PERIOD OF CONFUSIONS

A. Congressional Legislation Adds Fuel to the Controversy
In order to compensate for the lack of technical personnel and
facilities, 41 the Commissioner of Patents sought to establish a valid
channel through which examiners could obtain from competent authorities technical information regarding medical patent applications. In 1962, Congress passed a statute directing the Secretary of
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare "to furnish full
and complete information with respect to such questions relating to
drugs as the Commissioner may submit concerning any patent application." 42 Congress, at the same time, also broadened the FDA's
43
authority to check the effectiveness of new drugs.
The Patent Office interpreted the new legislation as a congressional endorsement of its inherent authority to oversee the safety
and workability of therapeutic inventions. Accordingly, the Commissioner decided to reopen the Hartop prosecution, because in the FDA's
opinion only actual clinical tests were adequate to prove the usefulness of the Hartop invention.44 Although the Commissioner's case
fizzled due to the inventor's eventual submission of the required evi39. Id. at 259.

40. Id.
41. It is recorded in the legislative history that: "The Patent Office examiners,
most of whom are skilled and trained in fields other than medicine and pharmacy,
could more effectively handle applications for drug patents if they were able to obtain
advice from the medical and other technical officials within the Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare, who deal with such matters day in and day out." H.R. REP.
No. 908, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), quoted in U.S.C. CONG. & AD. N.ws 2888
(1962).
42. See note 10 supra.
43. See note 11 supra.
44. See Marcus, supra note 18, at 675.
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dence, the battle between the CCPA and the Patent Office was renewed.
The CCPA argued that the congressional enlargement of the
FDA's power clearly established the legislative intent to confer exclusive jurisdiction to competent federal agencies other than the
Patent Office.45 The Commissioner, baffled by the court's adamant
attitude, sought a final decision from the Supreme Court.
B. Brenner v. Manson
Commissioner Brenner in Brenner v. Manson4" appealed to the
Supreme Court for its review of the CCPA's decision in an interference proceeding. The appellee claimed that he had discovered a
chemical process patented by two others prior to their Convention
date,47 and thus was entitled to the inventorship under the law. The
examiner refused to declare an interference in his favor for the reason that he failed to prove any utility of the steroid compound produced by the process.4 8 The appellee attempted to cure the defect
49
by citing an article which revealed that an adjacent homologue
of his compound was known to have tumor-inhibiting effects in mice.
The Board of Appeals, agreeing with the examiner, stated: "It is our
view that the statutory requirement of usefulness of a product cannot
be presumed merely because it happens to be closely related to another
compound which is known to be useful."50 As a result, the issue on
appeal in Manson could have been limited to the question whether
a novel and nonobvious chemical process is patentable where the sole
45. The CCPA has never changed its firm stand on the Hartop principle. For a
district court's discussion of the CCPA's position, see Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton
Laboratories, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 357, 371 (S.D.N.Y 1969).
46. 383 U.S. 519 (1966).
47. Under 35 U.S.C. § 104, an invention made in a foreign country is not entitled to priority calculated with respect to its invention date. Therefore, if Manson's
invention date was actually later than the foreign patentees' invention date, but earlier
than the first filing date in a foreign country (the Convention date), Manson could
still claim his priority of the invention.
48. The basis of the examiner's refusal was communicated to the Court through
his letter of May 24, 1960. 383 U.S. at 521.
49. A homologous series of chemical compounds is a family of compounds with
regular and predictable variations in both properties and structure. The structural difference of two homologues lies in units of the methylene group (=C- 2 ). A homologue
differs from its upper or lower "adjacent" homologue by one unit of =CH 2 . See id.
at 522 n.3.
50. Id. at 522.
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basis of alleging its utility is the known usefulness of a homologue adjacent to the compound synthesized by the process.
The CCPA, however, broadened the controversy considerably.
It held that a nonobvious and novel process is patentable "so long as
it yields the intended product and so long as the product is not itself
'detrimental.' "51 The decision was clearly a reflection of the CCPA's
reversion to Justice Story's definition of "useful" invention found in
Lowell and Bedford.5 2 It should be noted that Judge Rich in In re
Nelson 53 had held that new steroid intermediates were patentable, although it was not shown that the steroids synthesized from the intermediates were useful.5 4 The theory was that if "a new group of steroid
intermediates is useful to chemists doing research on steroids... [s]uch
intermediates are 'useful' under section 101." 55
The CCPA's position in Manson was, however, weakened by its
recent decision in In re Novak, 56 where it held that "proof by analogy"
was not sufficient to meet the utility requirement. Applicants in Novak
claimed that their salts of physiologically active and harmless organic
bases had useful therapeutic effects. 57 The inventors produced no evidence of the alleged therapeutic activity, contending that, since the
organic bases were safe and effective, their simple acid derivatives
should also be presumed to be innocuous and effective. 58 The CCPA,
denying the allegation, stated that no skilled person in the pharmaceutical field would accept such theory absent direct evidence that
the claimed products actually have the purported effects.59
Thus, when the Manson case was finally brought to the Supreme
Court, several issues were presented for review. As regards the basic
issue phrased in the Board's opinion, 60 the Court agreed with the
Board on the basis of the examiner's unchallenged finding that the
method of indirectly proving pharmaceutical properties of a steroid
51. Id. at 530-31 (footnote omitted).
52. See note 16 supra.
53. 280 F.2d 172 (C.O.P.A 1960).

54. The COPA has been at odds with the Patent Office over the utility requirement of chemical intermediates and processes as well as medicinal inventions. See, e.g.,
In re Wilke, 314 F.2d 558 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
55. 280 F.2d at 180 (emphasis in original).
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

306 F.2d 924 (C.C.P.A 1962).
Id. at 925-26.
Id. at 927.
Id. at 928.
See text accompanying note 50 supra.
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compound based on known properties of its homologues had been discredited because of the unpredictable nature of the steroid compounds.61 It then refused to express a view on the hypothetical question of whether the process could have been patented had the appellee submitted evidence showing that the product obtained from
2
the process exhibited tumor-inhibiting effects in laboratory animals.
The most controversial aspect of Manson lies in the Court's
opinion on the two remaining questions, raised primarily by the
CCPA. These were: "Is a chemical process 'useful' within the meaning of § 101 either (1) because it works-i.e., produces the intended
product? or (2) because the compound yielded belongs to a class
of compounds now the subject of serious scientific investigation?"03
The Court gave negative answers to both inquiries with the oft-quoted
statement that: "a patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the search but compensation for its successful [presumably
commercial] conclusion."6 4
Several explanations were given for the Court's holding that
"useful" inventions are only those that offer immediate benefits to
the public. Conceding that one of the main purposes of the patent
system is "to encourage dissemination of information concerning discoveries and inventions,"0' 5 Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority,
doubted whether the present patent system could fulfill the legislative
goal since "the highly developed art of drafting patent claims [enables
one to] disclose as little useful information as possible . .. while broadening the scope of the claim as widely as possible." 66 Hence, asserted
the Justice, "the argument based upon the virtue of disclosure must
be warily evaluated."0' 7 The Court's suspicion is unfounded because
the patent practitioner cannot afford to risk his client's interests by
withholding "useful" information. A third party is free to infringe,
with impunity, the patentee's monopoly rights when a clear and com61. 383 U.S. at 532.
62. Id. at 531 n.17.
63. Id. at 532.

64. Id. at 536.
65. Id. at 533.
66. Id. at 534.
67. Id. It should be pointed out that "patent claims" are not supposed
the disclosure of useful information; but "it is the specification (description
vention) that ...[should] set forth the invention 'in such full, clear, concise
terms' so as to allow one skilled in the art to make or use the invention." 19
U.L. Rav. 522, 531 (1970).

to provide
of the inand exact
CATHOLIC
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plete disclosure necessary to work the invention is not made or the
"best mode" description clause6 8 is not met. 69
It was argued that by not extending patent protection to discovery
of intermediate processes, inventors would have no incentive to disclose their research. The Court contended that this argument was
exaggerated since "if the inventor of a process cannot himself ascertain a 'use' for that which his process yields, he has every incentive
to make his invention known to those able to do so." 7 0° Again, the
Court's speculation is too simplistic. When an inventor (or his employer-corporation) cannot ascertain the use of his invention, there
are several options available. First, he or his assignee may choose to
make an early research disclosure of the invention so as to prevent
others from obtaining a patent on a similar invention. Since a voluntary research disclosure is not a patent application, the disclosing
party is not obligated to-and will not-provide "useful" information
beyond the extent that is needed to defeat a latecomer's patent application. A second route, which is suggested in Manson, is a private
contractual disclosure to a competent research group. Such a clandestine agreement does not, of course, amount to public disclosure. The
culmination of such a secret arrangement is usually the patenting of
the perfected invention. A third course that an individual or a corporation may pursue is to withhold the information from the public
with or without continuous explorations in search of "breakthrough"
discoveries by the inventor himself or by the employer corporation's
own research team. It is, therefore, quite puzzling that the Court failed
to recognize that any of these options could seriously mar the early
and adequate public disclosure of discoveries.
The Court continued to express its dogmatic patent law theory:
"To the extent that the patentee has power to enforce his patent,
71
there is little incentive for others to undertake a search for uses."1
"How likely," it asked, "is disclosure of a patented process to spur
72
research by others into the uses to which the product may be put?"
68. The Patent Act requires, among other things, that: "The specification shall
. . . set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1970).
69. The Act provides that failure to comply with any requirement of section 112
can be a valid defense in a patent infringement suit. Id. § 282(3).

70. 383 U.S. at 534.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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A use patent is not limited to a new use of the product synthesized by
the patented process. The list of possible use patents growing out
of a patented process can run the whole gamut of inventions: "use
of [the] . . . process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter,
or material."7 3 Furthermore, researchers do not study and reproduce
another's patented creation only to obtain use patents. They often
succeed in improving, modifying or even replacing the original. The
patent disclosure also enables the "watchdog" competitor to check
the falsity or lack of operativeness of the asserted invention. Even if
a second inventor can get only a use patent, he is supposed to be rewarded according to the value of his contribution-like any type of
invention. The original patent holder may not demand an unreasonable royalty;74 and is subject to strict scrutiny by competitors and
federal authorities for possible patent misuses. 7 5
The Court also relied heavily on its construction of the constitutional and congressional objective in reaching the decision. Article
one, section eight of the Constitution empowers the Congress to "promote the progress of . . . useful arts, by securing for limited times
to . . . inventors the exclusive right to their . . . discoveries." Section 101 of the Patent Act provides that: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor
."76 From these directives, the Court
inferred:
The basic quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the
Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by
the public from an invention with substantial utility. Unless and
until a process is refined and developed to this point-where specific
benefit exists in currently available form-there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to
77
be a broad field.

73. See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1970).

74. Excessive patent royalties may be considered antitrust violations. See American Photocopy Equip. Co. v. Rovico, Inc., 384 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1966); 34 Gno.
WASH. L. Rmv. 960 (1966).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948); Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947); Mercoid Corp.
v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944); United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 315
U.S. 788 (1942).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970).
77. 383 U.S. at 534-35.
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The validity of the Court's construction is assailable from several
viewpoints. First, its calculation of the quid pro quo rewarding is
premised on the Court's own dogmatic assumptions.7 8 Secondly, no
statutory language justifies the Court's interpretation that the quid
pro quo goal-equitable distribution of patent rights-can be best
achieved by protecting only those inventions whose end products can
be currently marketed. On the contrary, the only explicit condition
phrased in the Constitution is whether an alleged invention can be
utilized to promote the progress of beneficial arts. Finally, the Court's
simplistic formula, which essentially equates the merchantability
standard of a new drug under various administrative restrictions with
the section 101 patentability requirement, fails to take into account
the fact that the Patent Act comes from the patent clause of the Constitution whereas those statutes commissioning the FDA or the FTC
are products of the commerce clause.7 9 Manson could have been more
persuasive had it been able to explain the connecting factors between
the two heterogeneous sets of corigressional acts. In view of such
dubious reasoning, the overall effect of Manson remained to be seen.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Impact of the 1962 Legislation
An immediate consequence of the Drug Amendments Act of
196280 has been obviously the increased difficulty of marketing new
drugs. Under the law, a drug is deemed to be "adulterated" if it has
been prepared or packed under unsanitary conditions. 81 A drug, even
if already approved and marketed, can be ordered withdrawn whenever the Secretary of HEW reasonably believes that there is a lack
of substantial evidence that the drug has the alleged effect. 82 The
78. It is clear that the Court's conclusion is based on its misguided observations
that:
(1) little "useful" information can be found in today's patent documents due
to the slippery draftsmanship;
(2) one who cannot ascertain uses of his discovery will divulge "useful" information out of his anxiety; and
(3) even if the patent specification contains full description of the invention,
no one is really interested in further pursuing the patented invention.
79. 311 F.2d at 259.
80. 76 Stat. 780 (1962) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).
81. 21 U.S.C. § 351(a) (1970).

82. Id. § 355(e).
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CCPA, while agreeing with the administrative policy, resisted the
argument that the standard for patenting a medicine should be accordingly elevated.8 3
In re Anthony8 4 was the first instance where the CCPA ruled on
the role of advisory opinions furnished by the FDA. The assignee of
the Anthony patent, nine months after the marketing of a drug, reported to the FDA its suspicions of some ill-effects and voluntarily
removed it from the market.85 Upon this new development, the
Patent Office examiner withdrew his previous patent approval and
rejected the claims for lack of utility.80 The Board of Appeals, sustaining the rejection, stated: "Since the Secretary [of HEW] ... has
ruled [the drug] to be unsafe and as of today still considers the drug
unsafe this finding should not be lightly regarded by the Patent Office."'8 7 The CCPA disagreed with the Board and stated that, unless
the FDA's finding has unequivocally established that the claimed drug
is "completely and absolutely unsafe under all conditions . . . i.e.

...is medically 'useless', ' 88 it cannot be said that the drug is not useful in the patent law sense even if the administration has ordered it
to be recalled due to its lack of safety.
In Ex parte Dobson,89 the Patent Office Board of Appeals followed
the Anthony rule. The patent application on a certain antiperspirant
83.

The COPA in In re Anthony, 414 F.2d 1383 (O.C.P.A. 1969), first conceded

that:

Id.
in
in
•..

Although the patent statutes do not establish "safety" as a criterion for
patentability of any of the statutory classes of patentable subject matter mentioned in § 101, yet it is undoubtedly true .., that the Patent Office and the
courts over the years have considered "safety" as an aspect of the broader
question of whether certain inventions-pharmaceuticals in particular-are
"useful' within the meaning of § 101 . ... No one . . . would seriously
maintain that, as a matter of policy, a composition unsafe for use by reason
of extreme toxicity to the point of immediate death under all conditions of its
sole contemplated use in treating disease of the human organism would nevertheless be useful within the meaning of the patent laws.
at 1394 (footnote omitted).
But, at the same time, the court argued that: "'commercial usefulness,' i.e., progress
the development of a product to the extent that it is presently commercially salable
the market place, has never been a prerequisite for a reduction to practice and the
patentability of... drugs." Id. at 1396.
84. Id. at 1383.
85. Id. at 1390-92.
86. Id. at 1390.
87. Id. at 1393.
88. Id. at 1399 (emphasis in original).
89. 165 U.S.P.Q. 29 (P.O. Bd.App. 1969).

UTILITY REQUIREMENT
composition was denied by the examiner because of the FDA's doubt

as to its safety for a long term use.90 The Board of Appeals, however,
ruled that the invention was not required to meet such a high standard,
and that the applicant's evidence showing the safety and effectiveness
for a short term use was sufficient. 91
Thus, it suffices to conclude that the regulatory power governing
the safety of new medical products has been deferred to the exclusive
realm of those administrative agencies authorized under the law; and
that the safety requirement is no longer a major obstacle to patentability-at least in the tribunals which review Patent Office actions.
B. Aftermaths of Brenner v. Manson
Recently, the District Court for the Southern District of New
York expressed the view that Manson did not disturb "the holdings
of the CCPA insofar as scope and character of testing and safety for
humans is concerned." 92 The court adopted the rule set forth in Krimmel and Hartop that when some useful pharmaceutical property "has
been established by statistically significant tests with 'standard experimental animals,' sufficient statutory utility for the compounds has been
presented." 93 It observed that Manson "left as an open question the
utility of the process . . . described [in the specification] when demon94
strated [solely] in laboratory animals.1
The vitality of Manson is, however, apparent in the area concerning the admissibility of "proof by analogy." For example, in In
re Langer,9 5 the CCPA stated that indirect evidence of usefulness
is not sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement. There, one of the
major issues was whether the efficacy of structurally analogous compounds grouped in the generic claim could be inferred from the
verified utility of one menber of the genus. The examiner found
that certain references in the art had revealed negative results on
the alleged therapeutic effectiveness of the claimed compounds.9 6 The
court held that, under the circumstance, appellant was obligated to
90. Id. at 31.
91. Id.
92. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 357, 371
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
93. Id., citing In re Krimmel, 292 F.2d 948, 953 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
94. Id.
95. 503 F.2d 1380 (C.O.P.A. 1974).
96. Id. at 1392.
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submit evidence showing the asserted efficacy of each individual mem97
ber of the generic group.
Manson has also had a significant effect on the patenting of intermediate compounds. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision, there
was a prevailing view in the CCPA that a chemical compound is
useful per se; hence, an intermediate is useful so long as it can produce the intended end product.98 Since Manson, however, the CCPA
has reversed its position and has held that no intermediates are patentable unless the utility of their end products is specifically shown. 0
C. The Present CCPA Standard for the Section 101 Requirement
Consistent with the opinion expressed by the district court of
New York, 10 the CCPA believes Manson left undisturbed the issue
regarding the scope and nature of testing a new drug. In search for
a solution to the unsettled issue, the CCPA raised a fundamental question: why would an inventor be required to produce results from
clinical tests on humans? If such testing were required, answered
the court, it ought to be "because one of ordinary skill in the art
would not otherwise be satisfied to a reasonable certainty that the
subject matter in question possessed the requisite utility." 101
The reach of this functional approach has recently been considered in In re Langer.0 2 The invention concerned a group of decaypreventing compounds and methods for using them in a dentifrice.
Prior art references stated, based on non-clinical tests, 10 3 that the
claimed compounds were not effective in reducing dental caries. The
examiner ruled that the references established a "prima facie case
for lack of utility."'' °4 In rebuttal, the inventor produced evidence
based on clinical experiments employing standard laboratory animals.' 0 5 The application was still denied by the examiner who in97. Id. at 1395.
98. See notes 51-55 supra & accompanying text.
99. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 945-46 (O.O.P.A. 1967); In re Joly, 376 F.2d
906 (O.C.P.A. 1967).
100. 304 F. Supp. at 370-71.
101. In re Blake, 358 F.2d 750, 753 (O.C.P.A. 1966).
102. 503 F.2d 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
103. Id. at 1393.
104. Id. at 1392.
105. The applicant produced, among other things, clinical data based on a dental
paste experiment employing rats. The court found that rats are a standard animal in
"this technology." Id. at 1393-94.
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sisted that only clinical testing on humans could overcome the prima
facie case.10 6 The ruling was reversed by the CCPA, which held that
the clinical testing on animals, insofar as it would be more credible
and convincing than a non-clinical experiment to the ordinary skilled
person in the art, is sufficient to rebut the prima facie case. 07 Although
the issue was not raised in the case, the logic of Langer seems to permit one to conjecture that a higher level of testing (i.e., animal test
over non-clinical test; human test over animal test) may not be necessary to overcome a prima facie case, if, as of the invention date, new
test results are more credible than prior art data to the eye of the
standard person. 08
CONCLUSION

It seems clear that neither the demand for safety nor the extent
of required testing now raises an unreasonably onerous barrier to
patenting a medical invention. The utility standard in the pharmaceutical area essentially converges to the fundamental problem that
the entire patent field faces today: what is the working definition of
"useful" invention within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101? Judge
Rich in Nelson, as adopted in a proposed statute, 10 9 asserts that new
discoveries valuable to research workers are also useful within the
statutory meaning since they do contribute to the progress of useful
arts.
The Supreme Court in Brenner v. Manson disagrees with Nelson
under the premise that such liberal patent policy would negate the
quid pro quo spirit envisioned in the Constitution and the statute.
Even if the Court's criticism of Nelson were correct, the Manson
holding cannot attain the equitable goal either. For, under the Manson
plan, it is not one who has made the most significant contribution
but one who has made the last contribution that will be rewarded.
106. The examiner's rejection was partly based on a reference published by the
Drug and Cosmetic Industry. Id. at 1387.
107. Id. at 1395.
108. Although it has been held that utility must be determined as of the date of
invention, e.g., Banning v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 384 F. Supp. 831, 837 (S.D.
Tex. 1974), the rule is often deceptive. For example, Langer used references published
after the invention date "for the purpose of showing a fact." 503 F.2d at 1391.
109. One of the reform bills provides: "The term 'useful' shall include . . . utility
in ... research." S. 2756, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 100 (g) (1969).
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It is no answer to substitute one irregular system with another inequitable scheme.
Manson has reminded the patent world that the constitutional
plan of patenting is designed to achieve two paramount. purposes:
the promotion of the progress of useful arts and the quid pro quo
reward for contributions to such progress. It has also demonstrated
that the two goals cannot be attained by manipulating the definition
of the term "useful" alone. It behooves Congress, therefore, to
thoroughly reevaluate the present patent structure'1 0 and to establish
a system which can optimally realize both constitutional mandates."'
C. LEON KIM

110. For a discussion of various problems of the present patent system, see Bren9
ner, The Challenges to the Patent Systems in the 1 70's, 53 J. PAT. OFF. Soo'Y 407
(1971).
111. Related foreign practices may shed some light on the Manson problem. A recent survey of the patent laws of 77 countries found that only 12 countries, including the
United States, define the utility requirement by using the term "useful." The rest of the
countries specifically require that an invention be industrially or commercially applicable.
Major Provisions of Patent Legislation in Selected Countries, 13 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY
211, 250 (1974). It should be noted, however, that a majority of the countries used to,
or still, deny the patenting of chemical compounds and pharmaceuticals.
Recently, leading industrial countries such as Germany, Japan, France, the Netherlands and the Scandinavian group have adopted a procedure called "deferred examination." That is, the applicant can request a postponement of the examination for
several years after filing the application. Meanwhile, he can, among other things, do the
testing required to substantiate the alleged industrial application. For further discussion
of a deferred examination, see McKie, Is Deferred Examination of Patent Applications
Desirable in the United States?, 55 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 691 (1973).
Other countries, such as Argentina and Peru, issue "provisional patents." The
ultimate validity of a provisional patent depends on a showing of industrial applicability within a specified period. Major Provisions of Patent Legislation in Selected Countries, supra at 213-14, 262-63.

